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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, Texas courts handed down cases emphasiz-
ing that a drafter’s choice of words in the partnership agreement can have
dramatic effects in determining the rights and liabilities of partners. Spe-
cifically, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision
that interpreted a partnership’s purpose clause in such a way as to dra-
matically increase a limited partner’s ability to act on behalf of the part-
nership. In other cases, courts showed a willingness to interpret
applicable law in such a way as to permit creditors and other claimants to
collect against partnership assets, especially where the owners of the sub-
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ject partnership interests had perpetrated a fraud or otherwise acted in
bad faith to shield partnership assets. This article is divided into seven
main sections that explore recent decisions encompassing the following
topics: (1) existence of a partnership; (2) personal liability of members for
fraudulent transfers; (3) personal liability of members or managers under
agency principles; (4) admission of an estate’s representative as limited
partner; direct versus derivative claims; (5) purpose clauses and authority
of limited partner; (6) divorce and partnership property; and (7) credi-
tors’ remedies against a partner.
II. EXISTENCE OF A PARTNERSHIP
In Phillips v. Boo 2 You, LLC,1 the Austin Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a partnership had been created in the absence of a written
partnership agreement between the parties. Boo 2 You, LLC, a Texas lim-
ited liability company (Boo), operated a seasonal business that sold Hal-
loween merchandise. Steven Smith (Mr. Smith), as managing member,
managed Boo with assistance from his wife, Linda Smith (Mrs. Smith),
who was not a member of the company.2 Gary Phillips (Phillips) had
loaned money to Boo for purposes of financing its operating expenses. In
2010, Phillips approached Smith to discuss becoming a member in Boo.3
Although Mr. Smith did not agree to admit Phillips as a member, the
parties executed a Letter of Understanding (LOU) in March 2010. The
LOU provided for, among other things, an even split in the net proceeds
of stores Smith and Phillips would open together. In exchange for his
share of the proceeds, Phillips would contribute half of the expenses asso-
ciated with opening the new stores and Phillips would also participate in
operating the stores.4 Phillips contended that the LOU “evidenced both
the creation of a partnership as well as Phillips’s right to one-half of the
net proceeds” of Boo.5
Phillips subsequently contributed 50% of the expenses for three stores
opened by Boo.6 However, Phillips ceased his participation in the opera-
tion of the stores in the second week of October 2010, when he quit his
work in the store following a dispute with Mrs. Smith.7 Boo repaid Phil-
lips the principal and interest of Phillips’s $80,000 loan made to Boo for
the 2010 operating season, and no profits from the operations of those
stores were shared with Phillips.8
1. No. 03-14-00406-CV, 2016 WL 2907971 (Tex. App.—Austin May 13, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id.
4. Id. at *1–2. The court of appeals also noted that the agreement contemplated Phil-
lips’s participation in the operation of the new stores.
5. Id. at *1.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *3.
8. Id.
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Phillips sued Boo, Mr. Smith, and Mrs. Smith (together, the Appel-
lees), asserting that the Appellees had failed to distribute $29,638.80 in
profits to Phillips in a breach of the parties’ partnership agreement.9 The
trial court granted the Smiths summary judgment and sanctioned Phillips,
finding that the lawsuit was frivolous and designed to harass the Smiths.10
On appeal, Phillips argued that a partnership between himself and the
Appellees had been established. The Appellees submitted a motion for
summary judgment which asserted a lack of any evidence to support the
statutory factors demonstrating the existence of a partnership.11
The court of appeals analyzed the issue of whether a partnership had
been established between Phillips and the Appellees under the Texas
Business Organizations Code (TBOC), which contains a five-factor test:
(1) receipt or right to receive a share of the profits of the business;
(2) expression of an intent to be partners in the business; (3) partici-
pation or right to participate in control of the business; (4) agree-
ment to share or sharing: A. losses of the business; or B. liability for
claims by third parties against the business; and (5) agreement to
contribute or contributing money or property to the business.12
The court of appeals noted that the Texas Supreme Court has endorsed a
“totality-of-the-circumstances” approach when applying this test.13 The
presence of none of the five factors indicates that a partnership does not
exist, whereas the existence of all five factors establishes a partnership’s
existence as a matter of law.14 The court of appeals went on to observe
that it is more difficult to apply this test when there is support for some,
but not all, factors.15 The court of appeals proceeded to analyze whether
a genuine issue of material fact existed under the factors evidencing exis-
tence of a partnership in this case.16
Addressing the first factor, the court of appeals held there was a genu-
ine issue of material fact regarding the right to share profits in the busi-
ness.17 The court of appeals initially noted that the LOU contained a
profit-sharing provision.18 However, the Appellees claimed that the
profit-sharing concept was based on the conditions that (1) Phillips would
lend Boo $80,000 to be repaid following the 2010 season; and (2) Phillips
would work at the Boo stores during “the 2010 Halloween season.”19
9. Id. at *1. Phillips’s other arguments in the pleading asserted that the alleged failure
to distribute his claimed share of net profits constituted breach of contract, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and unjust enrichment.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id. at *1.
12. Id. at *2 (citing the factors set forth under TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052
(West 2012)).
13. Id. (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 896 (Tex. 2009)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3–5 (referencing the supreme court’s guidance in Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at
898–904).
17. Id. at *4.
18. Id. at *3.
19. Id.
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Phillips did lend Boo $80,000, but left work after a falling-out with Mrs.
Smith in early October and did not come back.20 The court of appeals
noted that profit sharing does not exclusively occur in the context of a
partnership, and that persons will not be partners if they do not intend to
share profits as co-owners.21 In examining Phillips’s role in the business,
the court of appeals noted that Phillips had characterized his work at Boo
as recreational in nature with no commitment to work at the stores, and
contrasted this against work performed in an ownership role, which
would lend support to a claim of a right to share in the business’s prof-
its.22 Ultimately, the court of appeals found that both sides had presented
sufficient evidence on the first prong to create a question of fact as to
whether the parties intended to share profits in the venture.23
The court of appeals emphasized in its analysis of the second factor,
expression of an intent to be partners, that this prong should be examined
using only “evidence not specifically probative of the other factors.”24
Phillips relied heavily on the LOU in support of his arguments relating to
the second factor. However, since Phillips had relied on the LOU in sup-
port of his argument for the first factor of the test, the court of appeals
reasoned that he was precluded from relying on the LOU to establish the
second factor.25 The court of appeals further noted that the conduct of
the parties, including “speech, writing and conduct[,]” should be reviewed
when evaluating whether an intent to be partners exists.26 Phillips did not
present evidence that the parties “held themselves out as partners,” re-
ferred to themselves as partners, held a bank account in the name of the
partnership, or created letterhead or other similar items that might other-
wise indicate the existence of the claimed partnership.27 As a result, the
court of appeals determined that no question of fact existed with respect
to the existence of the second factor.28
The court of appeals determined that no question of fact existed re-
garding the third factor since Phillips admitted in his deposition that he
had no control over Boo.29 The court noted that the third factor and the
first factor are given the greatest weight in assessing whether a partner-
ship exists.30
Regarding the fourth factor, Phillips argued that the loans he made to
Boo constituted a sharing of risk of loss. However, no evidence was intro-
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051(b) (West 2012); Strawn Nat’l
Bank v. Marchbanks, 74 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1934, writ ref’d)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 900 (Tex. 2009)).
25. Id.
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duced that the parties had discussed liabilities for third-party claims.31 In
its analysis of this factor, the court of appeals distinguished the discussion
of expenses from the discussion of losses, emphasizing that discussion of
expenses alone does not suffice to find that parties agree to share losses
and liabilities for third-party claims.32 In its application of this principle to
the facts of this case, the court of appeals determined that the $80,000 in
loans made by Phillips was insufficient to create a question of fact as to
whether the parties had agreed to share losses and liability for third-party
claims.33
In examining the fifth factor, the court of appeals disagreed with Phil-
lips’s argument that the $80,000 loan constituted a capital contribution.34
Mr. Smith had requested this amount as a loan from Phillips, and it was
repaid to Phillips with interest less than a year following disbursement.35
The court emphasized the parties’ “lender-borrower relationship,” which
had been established in the course of prior loans, finding that the terms of
repayment and interest rate supported the conclusion that these sums
were advanced in the context of a loan rather than partnership contribu-
tions.36 The court of appeals concluded that no issue of fact existed with
respect to the fifth factor.37
In its analysis of the five factors, the court of appeals found that Phil-
lips had raised an issue of fact with respect to only the first factor, the
agreement to share profits.38 Although this question of fact existed on
one of the factors carrying the greatest weight in Texas courts,39 the court
noted that the weight of the evidence did not support Phillips’s claim that
a partnership had been created. “Under the totality-of-the-circumstances
test prescribed by [the supreme court],” the court of appeals ultimately
determined that no genuine issue of fact existed as to whether a partner-
ship had been created, and the trial court’s judgment was affirmed.40
The Phillips case emphasizes the necessity of executing a partnership
agreement to confirm the existence of a partnership. Business persons in
Texas should insist on formalizing their partnership by negotiating and
executing a formal written partnership agreement. In the absence of a
written agreement, the importance of establishing the nature of the par-
ties’ relationship is illustrated by the outcome here. As the court of ap-
peals noted, there was enough evidence in support of Phillips’s assertion
that the parties had agreed to share profits to create an issue of fact for
that factor of the test.41 However, Phillips failed to distinguish his claimed
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 902 (Tex. 2009)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at *4–5.
35. Id. (noting that the interest rate of the loans was 12%).
36. Id. at *5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id. at *5–6.
41. Id. at *5.
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relationship as an owner from his prior dealings with the parties as a
lender, and this led to the court of appeals’ conclusion that no question of
fact existed for the fourth and fifth factors.42 Similarly, Phillips’s failure to
establish himself as an owner or partner thwarted Phillips’s arguments
relating to the second factor.43 The outcome of the case most likely would
have been different had Phillips insisted on the execution of a formal
written partnership agreement.
III. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF MEMBERS FOR
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
In Key v. Richards,44 the Austin Court of Appeals opined on the indi-
vidual liability of members of a limited liability company in the context of
a fraudulent transfer. PJC Properties, L.L.C. (PJC Properties), Steve Key
(Key), Pat Curry (Curry), and PJC Central Texas Freight Lines, L.L.C.
(collectively, Appellants) appealed a trial court judgment awarding dam-
ages to Prudence Adams and the court-appointed receiver for Centex
Freight Lines, L.L.C. (Centex) (collectively, Appellees) jointly and sever-
ally against Curry, Key, and PJC Properties for a fraudulent transfer of
Centex’s assets.45 The subject transaction involved a foreclosure and sale
of assets from Centex to PJC Properties, which the trial court found to be
fraudulent under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), citing
PJC Properties’ lack of an enforceable security interest and Centex’s fail-
ure to receive “reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the assets.”46
The Appellants objected to the trial court’s decision to pierce the corpo-
rate veil to impose personal liability on Key and Curry, and argued that
there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a
fraudulent transfer.47
The Appellants challenged the trial court’s determination that PJC
Properties had no security interest in Centex’s property by contending
that the Appellees’ arguments negating the claimed security interest were
based on “suspicion” and conjecture, not evidence, in an attempt to char-
42. Id. at *4–5.
43. Id. at *4.
44. No. 03-14-00116-CV, 2016 WL 240773 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 13, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.006(a) (West 2015)) (“A transfer
made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose
before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer
or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.”).
47. Id. The ownership of PJC Properties was structured such that, at the time of this
decision, Curry and Key owned 99% and 1%, respectively, of PJC Properties, and PJC
Centex was the wholly owned subsidiary of PJC Properties. Centex had ceased to be an
active entity at the time of the decision but was previously wholly owned by Walkabout
Transportation, LLC. The ownership of Walkabout Transportation, LLC was disputed and
the company was either wholly owned by Curry or, according to Key’s deposition, was
owned 10% by an individual who was not a party to the suit, 41% by Key, and 49% by PJC
Properties. Id. at *1 n.1.
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acterize a promissory note at trial as a “sham document.”48 The court of
appeals, however, disagreed and concluded that the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to find that PJC Properties did not have a security
interest in the assets in question, and that the transfer was fraudulent.49
In support of this determination, the court of appeals pointed to, among
other things, Key’s statement that Centex’s property had not been
“pledged as security for a debt”; the timing of filing of UCC financing
statements that noted a security in all of Centex’s property; and Key’s
deposition testimony that the only documents indicating that PJC Proper-
ties was a secured lender were the two UCC financing statements.50 The
court of appeals held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find
that the claimed security interest was fraudulent.51
The Appellants further contended that the trial court improperly im-
posed liability on Key and Curry in their individual capacities by piercing
the corporate veil.52 The court of appeals, however, distinguished individ-
ual liability in the context of fraud from the “equitable doctrine of veil-
piercing,” noting that under Texas law “an entity’s agent is personally
liable for his own fraudulent or tortious acts.”53 At trial, the jury found
that the transfer was fraudulent, and that Key and Curry could be held
individually “responsible for such tortious conduct[.]”54 The court of ap-
peals determined that, despite the similarity of the questions to the jury
to the case law on veil-piercing, the trial court was not required to use the
veil-piercing doctrine to find Key and Curry liable because Key and
Curry had committed a tort, not because equity demanded a veil
piercing.55
The court of appeals further noted that, although statutory law pro-
vides broad protection from individual liability for limited liability com-
pany members,56 there has not been clear direction from the Texas
Supreme Court on whether the current statutory protections countervail
common law principles holding corporate agents liable for fraudulent
conduct. Ultimately, the court of appeals “refuse[d] to hold that section
101.114 shields Key and Curry from their tortious fraudulent transfer
under the circumstances in this case.”57
48. Id. at *1. The promissory note by Centex was payable to PJC Properties. Appel-
lees claimed this note had been backdated.
49. Id. at *2.
50. Id. (noting that the UCC financing statements were filed both prior to the filing of
the initial suit and the day following the jury’s verdict in the first trial).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing, among others, Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex. 2002); Leyen-
decker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. 1984)).
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at *3 n.4 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (West 2012)) (“Except
as and to the extent the company agreement specifically provides otherwise, a member or
manager is not liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of a limited liability company, in-
cluding a debt, obligation, or liability under a judgment, decree, or order of a court.”).
57. Id.
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In its review of the Appellants’ final argument on sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the imposition of individual liability on Key and
Curry for their fraudulent conduct, the court of appeals found the Appel-
lants’ argument unpersuasive in light of the evidence presented.58 Among
other things, the court of appeals noted that Curry’s control of PJC
Properties and Key’s role as president of Centex during the applicable
time periods, as well as the acknowledged purpose of the foreclosure,
which was to ensure that Prudence Adams could not collect on her judg-
ment, sufficiently supported the jury’s finding.59 The judgment entered by
the trial court was affirmed.60 Justice Pemberton concurred with the ma-
jority’s decision, but noted that he had reached his conclusion by invok-
ing veil-piercing principles rather than individual liability for tortious
conduct.61
This case is illustrative of the broad liability to which individuals expose
themselves in the commission of fraudulent or tortious acts. Individuals
cannot rely on the Texas statutory framework as an absolute shield for
personal liability once their conduct rises to the level of fraudulent or
tortious actions.
IV. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OR MANAGERS
UNDER AGENCY PRINCIPLES
In Morello v. State of Texas,62 the Austin Court of Appeals explored
the individual liability of a manager of a limited liability company under
agency principles. Bernard Morello (Morello) appealed a trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the State of Texas (State) ordering
Morello to pay civil fines of $367,250.00 for alleged violations of rules of
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) by White Lion
Holdings, L.L.C. (White Lion), an entity managed and operated by Mo-
rello.63 White Lion had purchased certain property on which five surface-
water impoundments had created groundwater contamination and, at the
time of the conveyance, the property was subject to a hazardous waste
permit and compliance plan issued by the TCEQ governing the manage-
ment, correction, and clean-up of the contamination.64 The TCEQ trans-
ferred the permit and compliance plan to White Lion following the
purchase.65
Several years later, the State sued White Lion on behalf of the TCEQ,
claiming that White Lion had failed to follow the compliance plan, and
the State’s petition was eventually amended to also seek individual liabil-
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *5.
61. Id. at *5–6.
62. No. 03-15-00428-CV, 2016 WL 2742380 (Tex. App.—Austin May 6, 2016, pet.
filed) (mem. op.).
63. Id. at *1–2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *2.
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ity for Morello.66 The State alleged that Morello and White Lion had
failed to satisfy the requirements under the TCEQ’s compliance plan, in-
cluding a failure to provide financial assurance, submit reports for
groundwater monitoring, repair or replace broken recovery wells, con-
duct weekly inspections, notify the TCEQ of “corrective action system
shutdown,” and other duties set forth in the compliance plan.67 In its
summary judgment motion, the State argued that Morello had “ensured
that nothing would be done to comply with the terms, conditions, and
limitations set forth in the Compliance Plan,” including the payment of
financial assurance.68 Following a hearing and its review of the filings, the
trial court granted summary judgment to the State and held Morello lia-
ble in his individual capacity for the alleged violations.69
One of Morello’s assertions on appeal was that the State had estab-
lished no legal basis on which to hold him individually liable for White
Lion’s alleged failure to comply with the compliance plan.70 Since White
Lion was a limited liability company, Morello argued that he could not be
liable in his individual capacity unless either the veil of the company was
pierced or his alleged wrongful conduct involved actions for which indi-
vidual liability may be imposed upon an agent of a limited liability com-
pany, such as fraud.71 The State contended that, although the duties and
obligations under the permit and compliance plan had been transferred
to White Lion and not to Morello personally, Morello should be individu-
ally liable for his actions as White Lion’s decision maker.72
However, the State did not characterize its claims against Morello as
tort or fraud-based, but instead described this as “a statutory enforce-
ment action brought against Morello as operator and sole decision maker
of White Lion.”73 The State argued that under the applicable provisions
of the Texas Water Code, “[a] person may not cause, suffer, allow, or
permit a violation of a statute within the commission’s jurisdiction or a
rule adopted or an order or permit issued under such a statute,”74 and
further that “[a] person who causes, suffers, allows, or permits a violation
of a statute, rule, order, or permit” may be assessed a penalty.75 Accord-
ing to the State, the statute’s language providing for individual liability
should serve as the basis for Morello’s liability for White Lion’s viola-
tions.76 The State further contended that the common law principle of
individual liability of a manager for tortious or fraudulent actions should
66. Id. (The compliance plan required, among other things, that White Lion provide a
$574,000 financial assurance within six months following its purchase of the property.).
67. Id.
68. Id. at *3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *3, *5.
72. Id. at *6.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.101 (West 2008)).
75. Id. (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.102).
76. Id.
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be expanded to also cover “wrongful acts.”77 Since Morello purportedly
caused White Lion’s violations of the compliance plan intentionally, the
State claimed this conduct rose to the level of wrongful acts that create
individual liability for the entity’s decision maker.78 The State did not
claim in its motion for summary judgment or elsewhere that it was seek-
ing to pierce the corporate veil of White Lion, nor did it contend that
Morello caused White Lion to commit fraud.79
In analyzing the arguments, the court of appeals noted that the Texas
Limited Liability Company Act (Act) governed limited liability compa-
nies at the time Morello formed White Lion80 and, prior to this case, the
state legislature enacted the Business Organizations Code (Code), effec-
tive in January 2006, and the Code now governs the formation of limited
liability companies.81 Under both the Act and the Code, the court of ap-
peals observed that the members and managers of limited liability com-
panies are generally not liable for their company’s “debts, obligations or
liabilities” unless specifically provided in the entity’s operating agree-
ment.82 The court of appeals further noted that, although statutes are si-
lent, veil-piercing may possibly apply to limited liability companies in
Texas in a manner comparable to the application of the same common
law doctrine to corporations.83 The court further emphasized that prece-
dent exists in Texas for holding an agent liable “for his own fraudulent or
tortious acts.”84
However, the court of appeals distinguished those exceptions from the
State’s arguments. Here, the State did not assert that the violations of the
compliance plan were tortious or fraudulent and instead confirmed “that
the violations at issue [were] not torts[,]”85 nor did the State cite to any
recognizable veil-piercing theory under Texas law.86 The State’s assertion
that certain “wrongful acts” provide an independent or expanded basis
for individual liability apart from veil-piercing, tort, or fraud claims when
the applicable statute provides for individual liability was ultimately un-
77. Id. at *6–7. The court of appeals noted that each case cited in the State’s motion
for summary judgment in support of its “wrongful acts” argument recites the principle that
individual liability may be provided for corporate agents or employees for tortious or
fraudulent acts, but no support is provided for individual liability for wrongful acts that are
outside of those categories. Id. The court of appeals also noted in footnote 4 that “the cases
that were cited in support for the proposition that the employee could be held ‘personally
liable for the entity’s wrongdoing’ because he actively participated in the wrongdoing all
recited the general rule of law that an employee may be held personally liable for his
tortious or fraudulent acts that he committed during his employment.” Id. at *7 n.4.
78. Id. at *7.
79. Id. at *5.
80. Id. at *4; see Act of May 25, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 901, § 46, 1991 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3161, 3192–216 (as amended).
81. Morello, 2016 WL 2742380, at *4; see TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 402.001,
402.003, 402.005 (West 2012 & Supp. 2016) (describing the transition of the Code’s applica-
bility to previously formed entities).
82. Morello, 2016 WL 2742380, at *4.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *7 (citing Miller v. Keyser, 90 S.W.3d 712, 717–18 (Tex. 2002)).
85. Id. at *6–7.
86. Id. at *5.
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persuasive.87 The court of appeals noted that Texas courts have not rec-
ognized “wrongful acts” as an independent category or an expansion of
individual liability for tortious acts and instead emphasized that applica-
ble precedent for such claims for “wrongful acts” involved tortious or
fraudulent actions.88 The court of appeals did not find support for indi-
vidual liability beyond the scope of those categories.89 As a result, the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment was overturned because “the
State failed to establish as a matter of law that Morello could be held
individually liable for the alleged violations at issue,” and the case was
remanded for further proceedings.90
This case was particularly interesting following the same court of ap-
peals’ decision in Key v. Richards. In Key, the Austin Court of Appeals
was willing to apply individual liability to members of a limited liability
company in the context of a fraudulent transfer caused by those mem-
bers.91 In doing so, the court did not consider the statute which generally
shields members from individual liability to be superior to the common
law doctrine providing for individual liability for fraudulent acts, al-
though the court noted a lack of clear guidance on the issue from the
legislature and the Texas Supreme Court.92 Here, the court declined to
expand the scope of actions giving rise to individual liability beyond the
scope of veil-piercing and fraud or tort, noting that the State’s “wrongful
actions” claim serves as a subset of the existing bases for individual liabil-
ity and is not a viable, separate basis for such claims.93
V. ADMISSION OF AN ESTATE’S REPRESENTATIVE AS
LIMITED PARTNER; DIRECT VS.
DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
The San Antonio Court of Appeals examined the admission of a legal
representative of a limited partner’s estate as a limited partner and
whether certain claims are direct or derivative in nature in Shurberg v. La
Salle Industries.94 Rebecca Lord (Lord) was a limited partner in La Salle
Industries Limited, a limited partnership (La Salle LP).95 The general
partner of La Salle LP was La Salle Industries, Inc. (La Salle Industries),
which was controlled by relatives of Lord, Roy Martin (Roy) and his
87. Id. at *6–7.
88. Id. at *7–8.
89. Id. at *7.
90. Id. at *9.
91. Key v. Richards, No. 03-14-00116-CV, 2016 WL 240773, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin
Jan. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
92. Id. at *3 n.4 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (West 2012)); see also
notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
93. Morello, 2016 WL 2742380, at *7.
94. No. 04-15-00320-CV, 2016 WL 1128291, at *3–4, *6–9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Mar. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
95. Id. at *1. The original name of La Salle LP had been La Salle Industries, a Limited
Partnership, but this was changed to the current entity name in 2009.
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wife, Elizabeth Martin (Elizabeth) (together, the Martins).96 Both La
Salle LP and La Salle Industries were created by Charles Lord, and these
entities were structured so that his nieces and nephews would hold the
ownership interests.97 Following Charles Lord’s death, Roy began to liq-
uidate La Salle LP’s assets. Lord wrote two letters to Roy voicing con-
cerns about the status and transparency of La Salle LP’s operations.98
Lord died in 2012 and her husband, Jonathan Shurberg (Shurberg), was
appointed as representative of her estate.99
Shurberg sued La Salle LP, the Martins, and Roy G. Martin Jr. Prop-
erty Management, Inc. (Property Management, Inc.). The claims in-
cluded, among other things, mismanagement of La Salle LP, a demand to
remove La Salle Industries as general partner of La Salle LP, a demand
for an accounting, and a demand for access to La Salle LP’s books and
records.100 The remaining limited partners of La Salle LP were later
joined as defendants in the proceedings (together with La Salle LP, the
Martins, and Property Management, Inc., Defendants).101 The Defend-
ants claimed Shurberg did not have standing to sue because the action
was based on derivative claims, and Shurberg had not been admitted as a
limited partner to La Salle LP.102 The trial court agreed with the Defend-
ants and dismissed Shurberg’s claims. Shurberg appealed, arguing that he
was a limited a partner of La Salle LP as personal representative of
Lord’s estate and that many of his claims were direct instead of deriva-
tive.103 The Defendants also asserted that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction for the same reasons the Defendants argued Shurberg
lacked standing.104 The Defendants further claimed that Shurberg was
merely an assignee of Lord’s limited partnership interest rather than a
limited partner of La Salle LP.105
Shurberg’s claim asserting status as a limited partner consisted of three
elements: (1) the language of Section 153.113 of the TBOC; (2) the La
Salle LP operating agreement; and (3) the conduct of La Salle Industries
and the other limited partners.106 The relevant provision of the TBOC
provides:
If a limited partner who is an individual dies . . . the limited partner’s
. . . legal representative may exercise all of the limited partner’s
rights and powers to settle the limited partner’s estate or administer









104. Id. at *3.
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become a limited partner under the partnership agreement.107
Shurberg argued that his right to exert all of the limited partner’s rights
and powers to settle the estate automatically admitted him as a limited
partner of La Salle LP.
In analyzing the first prong of Shurberg’s claim, the court of appeals
noted that no case law exists constructing Section 153.113.108 In its review
of the statute’s language and the plain meaning of its words, the court
reasoned that the phrase “including the power of an assignee to become a
limited partner under the partnership agreement” indicated that
Shurberg did not automatically become a limited partner of La Salle LP
as a representative of Lord’s estate, and instead the statute allows him to
become a limited partner only if expressly permitted under La Salle LP’s
partnership agreement.109
Next, the court of appeals examined the La Salle LP partnership agree-
ment in connection with the second prong of Shurberg’s claim. Shurberg
cited the successors and assigns provision in the partnership agreement as
support for his admission as a limited partner, which reads as follows:
“This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal
representatives, successors and assigns where permitted by this Agree-
ment.”110 The court noted that, although this language binds an assignee
or successor to the terms of the limited partnership agreement, it does not
provide that the assignee or successor is admitted or becomes a limited
partner.111 Further, the court emphasized that the agreement’s assign-
ment provision expressly states that an assignee is not automatically enti-
tled to admission as a limited partner.112
For the third and final prong of Shurberg’s claim that he had been ad-
mitted as a limited partner, the court of appeals looked to the conduct of
the general partner (La Salle Industries) and the other limited part-
ners.113 Shurberg argued that the other limited partners had consented to
his admission as a limited partner in La Salle LP.114 The court noted that
the partnership agreement was silent with respect to the method of ad-
mission for a limited partner and agreed with Shurberg that Texas law
permits an assignee of a limited partner’s interest to be admitted if all
partners consent to such admission.115 However, the court disagreed with
Shurberg that the other partners had consented, pointing specifically to
107. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.113 (West 2012)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at *4 (quoting § 153.113).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4–5.
113. Id. at *5–6.
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 153.253(a) (West 2012)) (“An assignee
of a partnership interest . . . may become a limited partner if and to the extent that: (1) the
partnership agreement provides; or (2) all partners consent.”).
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the conduct of Roy.116 Roy had requested Lord’s probate information in
order to confirm that Shurberg had authority as representative and, al-
though Roy had also asked Shurberg for his contact information so he
could update La Salle LP’s records, the court concluded that the evidence
indicated that Roy’s conduct may have acknowledged that Shurberg
owned a partnership interest.117 However, the court determined there
was no evidence that Roy had actually consented to Shurberg becoming a
limited partner.118 Similarly, the court also determined there was no evi-
dence that any of the other limited partners had consented to Shurberg
becoming a limited partner, distinguishing the limited partners’ behavior
treating Shurberg, as Lord’s spouse, like a limited partner from those lim-
ited partners actually consenting to Shurberg becoming a limited part-
ner.119 Ultimately, the court of appeals found there was no issue of fact as
to whether Shurberg was a limited partner of La Salle LP, and all three
prongs of Shurberg’s argument relating to this issue failed.120
Concluding that Shurberg had not been admitted as a limited partner,
the court of appeals moved on to analyze his next argument: that
Shurberg’s claims for (1) an accounting; (2) access to books and records;
(3) removal of the general partner; and (4) application for injunctive re-
lief, temporary restraining order, and the appointment of a receiver were
direct claims and not derivative.121 Since Shurberg was not a limited part-
ner, he could only sue for direct claims, meaning those where “the wrong-
doer violates a duty that arises from a contract or otherwise that is owed
directly by the wrongdoer to the stakeholder.”122 On the other hand, only
limited partners may bring derivative claims, which allow a limited part-
ner to sue in the name of the partnership so that each limited partner and
the partnership itself may be made whole.123
In its analysis of Shurberg’s accounting claim, the court of appeals
noted that an accounting claim is considered derivative if it is brought as
part of another derivative action.124 Here, Shurberg demanded an ac-
counting “in order to ascertain the amount due to the limited partners,
including the Estate”125 as a result of the damage alleged under his
breach of fiduciary duty claim.126 Since the breach of fiduciary duty claim
was undisputed as derivative, the court concluded that the accounting
116. Id. at *5–6.
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *6.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *7 (noting that Shurberg’s other claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negli-
gent misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of contract were derivative, which neither party
disputed.).
122. Id. (citing Swank v. Cunningham, 258 S.W.3d 647, 661 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008,
pet. denied)).
123. Id. at *6–7 (citing Swank, 258 S.W.3d at 661).
124. Id. at *8.
125. Id. at *9.
126. Id.
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claim was also derivative.127
The court of appeals also assessed Shurberg’s claim for access to books
and records of La Salle LP, noting that the Defendants agreed that
Shurberg’s claim was direct.128 However, the Defendants contended that
no justiciable controversy existed for this claim since Shurberg had al-
ready been granted access to the books and records and remained free to
access them again.129 The court agreed that, since Shurberg had previ-
ously been granted access and maintained the right to inspect those books
and records in the future, no justiciable controversy existed with respect
to this claim.130
In examining Shurberg’s third and fourth claims, the court of appeals
looked to whether the injuries allegedly suffered by Shurberg were dis-
tinct from those injuries allegedly suffered by La Salle LP, noting that no
“separate and independent right” existed to bring these claims if the in-
jury was the same.131 The court further emphasized that these claims de-
rived from Shurberg’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and that Shurberg
failed to describe injuries distinct from those suffered by La Salle LP in
his live pleading.132 As a result, the court determined that Shurberg’s
third and fourth claims were derivative.133
Ultimately, the court of appeals held that Shurberg was not a limited
partner in La Salle LP and he lacked standing to file all claims against the
Defendants, except for the claim relating to access to books and
records.134 The access claim, however, was not a justiciable contro-
versy.135 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.136
Shurberg v. La Salle Industries Limited provides valuable guidance
concerning Section 153.113 of the TBOC, establishing that an estate’s
representative is not automatically admitted as a limited partner.137 Texas
estate representatives should be aware that, unless the partnership agree-
ment expressly provides for admission of the representative as a limited
partner without action by the other partners, the representative will not
automatically be characterized as a limited partner under the TBOC.138
127. Id. at *7, *9.
128. Id. at *8.
129. Id.
130. Id.




134. Id. at *6, *9.
135. Id. at *8, *9.
136. Id. at *9.
137. Id. at *4–5.
138. See id.
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VI. PURPOSE CLAUSES AND AUTHORITY
OF LIMITED PARTNER
The Texas Supreme Court recently overturned a decision by the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals interpreting the scope of a broadly
drafted purpose clause in an entity’s operating agreement, restoring limi-
tations on the liability of upstream owners for the negligent acts of mem-
bers and limited partners in certain circumstances.139 In Doctors Hospital
at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Andrade, the supreme court addressed the ques-
tion of whether a limited partnership owning a hospital, or the partner-
ship’s general partner, may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of
a doctor who is also a limited partner.140 Last year, the court of appeals
held that the limited partnership’s purpose clause was so broadly drafted
that a jury could find that a limited partner/physician’s medical negli-
gence was committed in the ordinary course of the partnership’s busi-
ness.141 The court of appeals’ ruling was a cause of some concern for
drafters of partnership agreements, given that many purpose clauses are
drafted in very broad terms and without consideration for the implica-
tions of the specific language used. In particular, hospitals where practic-
ing physicians were also investors had reason to fear the potential for new
and unanticipated liability for medical malpractice claims after the deci-
sion from the court of appeals. The supreme court, however, reached a
different conclusion on the scope of the partnership’s purpose clause,
holding that the doctor’s medical treatment of a patient was outside of
the ordinary course of the partnership’s business as a matter of law, de-
spite the generic language of the purpose clause in the partnership agree-
ment.142 Therefore, the supreme court’s decision precluded the injured
parties from seeking damages from the partnership owning the hospital
for the negligent actions of the limited partner/physician.143
The controversy arose when Jesus Jaime Andrade and Jessica Andrade
(together, the Andrades) alleged that their doctor, Rodolfo Lozano
(Doctor Lozano), negligently delivered their daughter Julianna, resulting
in permanent injury to the child.144 The delivery had been complicated by
the fact that one of the baby’s shoulders had been unable to pass through
the birth canal. Doctor Lozano was alleged to have “engaged in excessive
twisting” to free the shoulder and deliver the child, resulting in perma-
nent nerve damage to the child’s arm.145 The Andrades sought to recover
damages from the limited partnership that owned the hospital where the
child was born (Hospital LP), and from the limited liability company that
served as the general partner of Hospital LP (GP LLC), under the theory
139. Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Andrade, 493 S.W.3d 545, 546–47 (Tex.
2016).
140. Id. at 546.
141. Id. at 547.
142. Id. at 548.
143. See id. at 551.
144. Id. at 546.
145. Id.
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that Hospital LP and GP LLC were vicariously liable for Doctor
Lozano’s negligence since he was acting in his capacity as a limited part-
ner of Hospital LP.146
In the trial court, Hospital LP and GP LLC moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that even if Doctor Lozano had committed negli-
gence, the partnership could not be liable for his conduct because he was
not acting in the ordinary course of the partnership’s business or with the
authority of the partnership to the extent that he was providing medical
services to patients.147 The trial court denied the partnership’s motion for
summary judgment but granted an immediate interlocutory appeal on the
issue.148 The court of appeals read Hospital LP’s partnership agreement
in the same way as the trial court and upheld its decision to deny sum-
mary judgment, finding that the purpose clause contained in the partner-
ship agreement was so broadly drafted as to raise a question of fact on
the issue of whether Doctor Lozano was acting within the scope of the
partnership and/or with the partnership’s authority.149 The purpose
clause in Hospital LP’s partnership agreement stated that the purpose of
the partnership was:
(i) to develop, construct and operate such Health Care Facilities as
the General Partner may deem appropriate from time to time; (ii)
prior to the Spin–Off, to own an interest in DHR Real Estate [Part-
ners, Ltd.] and DHR [Real Estate Management, L.L.C.]; (iii) to own,
develop, operate and engage in such other business activities as the
General Partner may deem appropriate from time to time; and (iv)
to enter into, make and perform all such agreements and undertak-
ings, and to engage in all such activities and transactions, as the Gen-
eral Partner may deem necessary or appropriate for or incidental to
the carrying out of the foregoing objects and purposes.150
A reading of the partnership’s purpose clause seems to indicate the
drafter’s specific intention to authorize the general partner to “develop,
construct and operate” hospitals, and to have an ownership interest in a
subsidiary entity prior to an anticipated “spin-off.”151 While it seems un-
likely that the entity responsible for developing and constructing a health
care facility would then be expected to “operate” such a facility at the
level of delivering babies, the “catch-all” language that follows seems to
authorize the partnership to engage in any other business activities that
the general partner chooses.152 The purpose clause of GP LLC’s operat-
ing agreement was even broader, stating that
146. Id.
147. Id. at 546–47; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.303 (West 2012) (defin-
ing the scope of a partnership’s liability).
148. Andrade, 493 S.W.3d at 547.
149. Id. at 547; Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Andrade, No. 13-15-00046-CV,
2015 WL 3799425, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 18, 2015), rev’d, 493 S.W.3d 545,
551 (Tex. 2016).
150. Andrade, 493 S.W.3d at 548.
151. See id.
152. See id.
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[t]he purpose for which this limited liability company is organized is
to transact any and all lawful business for which limited liability com-
panies may be organized under the laws of Texas, including, but not
limited to, the following: . . . [t]o buy, rent, sell, manufacture, pro-
duce, assemble, distribute, repair, and service any and all products or
services in which the company desires to engage[.]153
Therefore, if the Andrades could show that Hospital LP was liable for
Doctor Lozano’s negligence, they could easily argue that Hospital LP was
acting in the normal course of GP LLC’s business, thereby exposing an
additional upstream entity to liability on their negligence claim.154
The court of appeals sided with the Andrades, concluding that under
the terms of the partnership agreement, the scope of permissible activities
in which Hospital LP might engage was very broad, and could not be said
as a matter of law to exclude the practice of medicine.155 Given that the
partnership agreement contained generic “purpose clause” language but
did not include a provision specifically authorizing limited partners to
practice medicine as part of the partnership’s business, the court of ap-
peals’ ruling had the potential to subject similarly situated hospitals to a
new and unanticipated source of liability—i.e., from lawsuits arising from
medical malpractice claims against doctors who are also investors in the
facility itself. While the decision had the potential to provide patients
with medical negligence claims with additional sources of recovery for
their damages, the imposition of this additional and unanticipated liabil-
ity on partnerships in the healthcare business also had the potential to
increase the costs of operating such partnerships, which in turn could in-
crease the cost and availability of healthcare in general.
In overturning the decision of the court of appeals, the supreme court
concluded that the permitted scope of Hospital LP’s business as set forth
in the partnership agreement, however broad, excluded the practice of
medicine.156 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court focused on
provisions of the partnership agreement indicating that it was to be con-
strued in accordance with Texas law, and that Texas law would govern in
the event of a conflict between the terms of the partnership agreement
and Texas law.157 Because Texas law permits only natural persons, not
partnerships, to be licensed to practice medicine, the partnership agree-
ment would have to be interpreted to include “the unlawful practice of
medicine” among Hospital LP’s permitted activities in order for Doctor
Lozano’s conduct to fall within the ordinary scope of the partnership’s
business.158 Therefore, the supreme court interpreted the partnership
agreement’s purpose clause to exclude the practice of medicine, meaning
that Doctor Lozano’s negligent treatment of the Andrades’ child could
153. Doctors Hosp., 2015 WL 3799425, at *5 n.5.
154. See id. at *1.
155. Id. at *7.
156. Andrade, 493 S.W.3d at 551.
157. Id. at 548.
158. Id.
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not be within the ordinary course of Hospital LP’s business.159
Lastly, the supreme court briefly analyzed the Andrades’ contention
that Hospital LP was liable for the actions of Doctor Lozano even if his
actions were not within the ordinary course of the partnership’s business
because he was acting “with the authority of the partnership.”160 While it
is true that Texas law provides that a partnership is liable for the acts of a
partner acting with the partnership’s authority, the supreme court held
that Doctor Lozano’s medical treatment of the Andrades was not per-
formed with such authority.161 The supreme court noted that “[t]he part-
nership agreement is the source of authority” for the partnership, setting
forth the management structure of the partnership and the role of limited
partners in partnership affairs, if any.162 In this case, Hospital LP’s part-
nership agreement expressly prohibited limited partners from acting on
behalf of the partnership unless specifically authorized to do so elsewhere
in the partnership agreement.163
Drafters of partnership agreements often use broadly drafted purpose
clauses in their partnership agreements in order to impart a greater de-
gree of flexibility in conducting the partnership’s business, and to make
clear that the partnership has the necessary authority under its organiza-
tional documents to undertake such business activities.164 Although the
supreme court in this case has drawn a limitation on the extent to which a
broadly drafted purpose clause can impose liability on a partnership for
the actions of its limited partner, it is important to note that the applica-
bility of the supreme court’s decision in future cases may prove to be
confined to the area of medical negligence. It is therefore crucial for
drafters of partnership agreements to carefully tailor a partnership’s pur-
pose clause to impart the desired degree of flexibility for the partner-
ship’s business activities, while at the same time expressly excluding
activities intended to be outside the scope of the partnership’s business,
and which, if engaged in by a limited partner, could otherwise be attrib-
uted to the partnership and therefore expose it to unanticipated
liabilities.
VII. DIVORCE AND PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
In In re K.R.C.,165 the Dallas Court of Appeals offered some clarifica-
tion on the circumstances in which partnership assets may be reached in
order to satisfy a divorce judgment against a limited partner. Together,
husband and wife owned 100% of Aecium, a limited partnership in the
159. Id. at 549, 551.
160. Id. at 550–51.
161. Id. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.303(a)(2) (West 2012) for the applica-
ble statute.
162. Andrade, 493 S.W.3d at 550.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 550–51.
165. No. 05-13-01419-CV, 2015 WL 7731784 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 1, 2015, pet. de-
nied) (mem. op.).
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business of selling medical billing software and services.166 The couple
had been married in 1999.167 Things seemed to go well until about 2007 or
2008, when the husband and an Aecium employee developed a sexual
relationship and the husband, in 2009, caused the partnership to give the
employee an 80% raise.168 The husband continued to cause the partner-
ship to pay his mistress an exorbitant salary through 2010, when husband
and wife separated and the wife filed for divorce.169
In light of these events, the wife petitioned the trial court for a dispro-
portionately large share of the community assets. She alleged that the
husband caused the marriage to fail by committing adultery, fraud on the
community, and waste of community assets by siphoning assets to his mis-
tress.170 Two business appraisers testified at trial that the husband had
indeed caused the partnership to overpay the employee by approximately
$150,000 over the course of their two-year affair.171 In particular, the wife
requested that the trial court “reconstitute the community estate” by
clawing back funds from the husband in an amount equal to the amount
by which the partnership overpaid the mistress, plus the amount of a loan
that the partnership made to the mistress for repairs to her home.172 The
trial court granted most of the wife’s requests, declaring the husband
guilty of adultery and awarding her an “equalization payment” in the
amount of $347,000, which included $195,000 for the excessive payments
that were paid to the mistress in the form of a salary from the
partnership.173
But was it their money that the husband had been siphoning to his mis-
tress, or was it partnership property that Aecium had paid to its em-
ployee? The husband, perhaps not surprisingly, argued for the latter
interpretation.174 He objected to the trial court’s equalization payment to
his wife on this and other grounds, arguing that the trial court was wrong
to award his wife the $195,000 representing excessive salary paid by the
partnership to his mistress since partnership assets are not community
property, and because a limited partner has no right to specific partner-
ship assets.175 In support of his position, the husband relied in part on
another Texas divorce case, Lifshutz v. Lifshutz.176 In Lifshutz, the wife
in a divorce proceeding asked the court to pierce the corporate veil of her
husband’s companies in order to include specific partnership assets in its





171. Id. The amount calculated by the appraisers did not include overpayments made
by the partnership to the employee in 2012.
172. Id. at *1–2. The wife also requested repayment of other amounts, including money
spent to repair the husband’s jet ski.
173. Id. at *2.
174. Id. at *4.
175. Id.
176. 61 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
2017] Partnership Law 341
valuation of the community estate.177 In that case, the San Antonio Court
of Appeals held that a court may not award specific partnership assets to
the wife because partnership assets are not community property.178
The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the facts of Lif-
shutz differed from this case in significant ways.179 The court of appeals
focused on the fact that in Lifshutz, the husband acquired his partnership
interests before marrying his wife, making such partnership interests his
separate property.180 Furthermore, the wife in Lifshutz was not a partner
in the partnership.181 Here, husband and wife were both partners, owning
100% of the outstanding partnership interests in Aecium.182 Therefore,
unlike in Lifshutz, the wife in this case was not a third party seeking to
pierce the veil of a partnership, but rather a 50% limited partner seeking
to claw back the assets of a partnership that another limited partner
fraudulently conveyed out of the partnership to his mistress.183 There-
fore, the court of appeals concluded, when the husband caused the part-
nership to pay his mistress an excessive salary, he effectively used the
partnership to drain funds from the community estate.184 It was therefore
within the trial court’s discretion to award the wife an amount equal to
the partnership funds that the partnership paid to the mistress in the form
of excessive salary.185
VIII. CREDITORS’ REMEDIES AGAINST A PARTNER
In Spates v. Office of the Attorney General,186 the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals explored the question of whether the State of Texas
may reach the assets of a limited liability company in order to collect
unpaid child support judgments from a member of such limited liability
company. Christopher Spates was the sole member of Prodigy Services,
LLC (Prodigy), the father of three children by three different mothers,
and the subject of three outstanding child support judgments totaling
over $94,000.187 Prodigy was the plaintiff in a lawsuit against a company
called Eni US Operating Company (Eni), seeking damages for breach of
contract and tortious interference with contract.188 Mr. Spates was de-
posed at one point in connection with the proceedings, but was not him-
self a party to the case.189 Immediately after Spates was deposed, the
Child Support Division of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG)
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intervened in the case, seeking to satisfy each of the three child support
judgment liens against Spates from the proceeds of any award that Prod-
igy might receive in its suit against Eni.190 Before intervening in the Prod-
igy case, the OAG had searched diligently for any other assets of Spates
from which to satisfy the child support judgments, and had found noth-
ing.191 It is unclear from the record whether Spates had cleverly hidden
his assets or was actually broke—but in either case, Prodigy’s lawsuit and
the potential award arising therefrom represented the OAG’s best chance
of collecting any unpaid child support from Spates.
Shortly after the OAG’s appearance, Prodigy and Eni reached a settle-
ment agreement to pay Prodigy $257,500, which amount Eni deposited
with the trial court registry.192 As the sole member of Prodigy, Spates
could have anticipated a distribution of the cash award out to himself, if
not for the well-timed appearance of the OAG. At this point, the trial
court refused to order the release of the $257,500 to Prodigy, and granted
the OAG’s request for a charging order against Spates’s membership in-
terest in Prodigy.193 The charging order also listed the home address and
amount of unpaid child support Spates owed to each child’s mother.194
Spates and Prodigy immediately appealed the trial court’s decision on a
number of grounds, including (i) that the trial court lacked the necessary
personal jurisdiction over Spates, who was not a party to the case; and (ii)
that the OAG did not follow the procedures necessary to obtain a charg-
ing order.195
Before addressing Spates and Prodigy’s arguments on appeal, the court
of appeals announced that it would first address whether it had jurisdic-
tion to hear Spates’s arguments, despite the fact that no party contested
the court’s jurisdiction.196 The court noted that Spates was not a party to
the trial court action, and had made no attempt to intervene in the pro-
ceedings when the OAG made its appearance and moved to enforce the
child support judgments.197 The court of appeals further noted that
Spates’s status as a member of Prodigy did not in itself give him standing
to appeal the trial court’s decision.198 And because Spates himself failed
to make any argument that he had standing to appeal the trial court’s
order—arguing, to the contrary, that the trial court had insufficient juris-
diction over him to allow the OAG’s intervention in the trial court—the
court of appeals dismissed Spates’s appeal, leaving Prodigy itself to bring
the appeal.199
Prodigy, for its part, sought to overturn the trial court’s order on two
190. Id.
191. Id. at 555–56.
192. Id. at 549.
193. Id.
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grounds.200 First, Prodigy challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction over
Spates and over child support matters generally, arguing that the respec-
tive family courts in which each of the three mothers had obtained their
child support judgments had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
parties and the child support matters.201 Prodigy also focused on the fact
that the child support judgments were against Spates personally, who was
not a party to the case in the trial court, and whose status as a member of
Prodigy, a limited liability company, did not give him a claim to any spe-
cific assets owned by such entity.202
The court of appeals rejected all of Prodigy’s arguments, holding that
the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the OAG’s motion and to grant the
charging order.203 The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did
not need to make Spates a party to the case in order to have jurisdiction
to issue the charging order requested by the OAG, noting that the TBOC
“does not require that the judgment debtor be made a party” to a case
before a judgment creditor is permitted to enter a motion for a “charging
order against the debtor’s membership interest in the limited liability
company.”204 Further, the court of appeals noted that the charging order
was directed at Prodigy, not Spates, and in fact did not impose any obliga-
tions on Spates at all.205 Rather, the charging order had the effect of obli-
gating Prodigy to disregard the distribution provisions in its operating
agreement, and instead to pay any distributions to the State of Texas up
to the full amount of the child support judgments.206 For the same reason,
the court of appeals concluded that the charging order did not entitle the
OAG to obtain any specific partnership assets, as Spates and Prodigy had
argued.207 In effect, the trial court granted the OAG a lien on Spates’s
membership interest in Prodigy.208 While a lien against Spates’s member-
ship interest in Prodigy may have been the OAG’s best chance to force
Spates to pay child support, it is important to note the inherent limita-
tions of the remedy. The charging order did not grant the OAG the right
to foreclose on its interest in the distributions from Prodigy, nor did the
OAG have any other legal or equitable rights with respect to Prodigy’s
assets (including the $257,500 award from Eni).209 Spates himself re-
tained control of Prodigy in his capacity as sole member, and he could not
be compelled to cause Prodigy to make a distribution.210 In this particular
case, however, refusing to declare a distribution out of spite would be a
costly move for Spates, since the interest on the child support judgments
200. Id. at 554.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.106(b) (West 2012).
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would continue to grow, and Spates would have to forego receiving the
balance of the $257,500 award indefinitely.
IX. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the cases from this Survey period emphasize the theme
that a drafter’s word choice in the partnership agreement can play a criti-
cal role in determining the rights and responsibilities of the partners.
Drafters must carefully select the language of each partnership provision
in order to allocate liabilities among the partners in a predictable way.
Other cases reflect a longstanding interest in preserving the limited liabil-
ity protection conferred upon members and partners of limited liability
companies and limited partnerships formed under Texas law. At the same
time, in cases where partners have committed fraud or otherwise acted in
bad faith with respect to partnership assets, the courts have shown an
enthusiasm for resolving statutory ambiguities against such partners in
order to maximize the ability of creditors and other interested parties to
reach partnership assets—perhaps an indication that the courts believe
the remedies available in such circumstances are too limited. Further, at-
torneys must consider and account for ambiguities in the TBOC that may
affect their clients’ rights and remedies in the event of litigation. Lastly, a
common takeaway in nearly every case is that the provisions commonly
considered “boilerplate” in partnership agreements should be considered
as part of the overall scheme of partnership operations, balancing flexibil-
ity to conduct partnership business with practical limitations on the au-
thority of the partners in order to guard against unanticipated liabilities.
